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1ABSTRACT
Board independence is an important corporate governance element and 
without good governance it is impossible to form a unitary board system. 
After the crash in Bangladesh in 2011, it becomes a major issue for public 
listed companies in Bangladesh to follow a unitary system. This study 
addresses the issue by examining statistical relationship between corporate 
ownership and board independence. Descriptive statistics, bivariate analysis 
and multiple regression techniques are applied in analyzing the attitudes 
of family, public and institutional owners towards board composition, the 
degree of influence each type of owner has on board and the presence goes 
beyond board independence. The results show that board are lacking in 
independence and family ownership has a significant, negative effect on 
board independence, in which the results indicate that public and institutional 
ownership have a positive, nonsignificant influence. It is recommended for 
professionals to be included on board and that nonexecutive directors should 
be selected by a search committee to ensure that their competency matches 
the firm needs. It is further recommended that there should be a minimum 
of two independent directors and that management should be motivated, 
in line with the positive reinforcement theory. The German or Japanese 
model (two-tier board) can also be considered. This study also suggests 
that regulators should rethink how an independent and professional board 
can be formed when the barrier of concentrated ownership is removed.
Keywords: Corporate governance, board independence, family ownership, 
corporate ownership, Bangladesh
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INTRODUCTION
An independent corporate board is a prerequisite for good corporate 
governance, especially for unitary board (one-tier board), where board is 
the highest authority. The past records of corporate scandal such as Enron, 
WorldCom, Waste Management, Tyco show that management is involved 
in malpractice and these occurred with the connivance of the board. This 
has raised an issue regarding board monitoring effectiveness (Raphaelson 
& Wahlen, 2004). The monitoring mechanism is insufficient and dominant 
individuals or cliques have overwhelming influence on board members 
(Rose, 2005). The scandals underline the importance of good governance1, 
leading to call for boardroom reform and attract the attention of stakeholders, 
policymakers, researchers, regulators and professional bodies. Among the 
reform agendas, board independence is one of particular interest (Rashid, 
2015).
The recent capital market crash2 has seriously eroded the stakeholders’ 
confidence level. The Probe Committee inquiry report3 states that malpractice 
occurs at firm level, market level and regulator level. Irregularities in 
private placement, book building, direct listing, bonus issue, right issue, 
asset revaluation, tax deferral, serial trading, management earnings, false 
reporting and other practices are identified by the Probe Committee (2011) 
as the cause of share price bubble. The irregularities create a negative 
impression among stakeholders about board monitoring capability and 
independence of the board. The World Bank report (2009) on corporate 
governance in Bangladesh states that greater independence is required 
in boardroom. The majority of listed companies’ ownership is in the 
hand of family members (Hasan, Abdul Rahman & Hossain, 2014). The 
company senior management who were involved in past scandals took 
control over the board with a deliberate view to meet target by fraudulent 
financial statement, as if they meet stakeholder expectation (Rose, 2005). 
Corporate board should, therefore, be on their guard and employ a proactive 
approach to prevent fraudulent activities. When stakeholders have limited 
information, opportunistic directors have the room to manipulate financial 
1 Djodat, N., & Nguyen, T. 2008. Corporate governance disclosure in emerging markets. 
Downloaded from: https://www.uni-ulm.de/fileadmin/website_uni_ulm/mawi2/forschung/preprint- 
server/2008/0807_corporate_governance.pdf
2 Largest crash (2011) of capital market in corporate history of Bangladesh
3 This report is prepared by Probe Committee - 2011
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report (Hasan, Hossain & Abdul Rahman, 2014a). In Bangladesh, the 
percentage of discretionary accruals in financial reporting is very high 
(Hasan, Abdul Rahman & Hossain, 2014b), which leads to suspicion over 
creative accounting.
Corporate governance guidelines for listed companies were issued 
by the Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) in 
2006 and revised in 2012, after the market crash. Bangladeshi companies 
follow an Anglo-American model (one-tier board) where the board is the 
highest governing body. All corporate governance models revolve around 
four core principles, namely fairness, accountability, responsibility and 
transparency. The specific characteristics of independent director are 
mentioned in both guidelines. An independent and effective board is crucial 
for good governance. It also generates corporate revenue by the buildup 
of trustworthiness and corporate reputation among existing and potential 
stakeholders (Hasan, Omar & Handley-Schacler, 2015a). Besides, firm 
corporate governance level has a positive and significant relationship with 
market capitalisation (Hasan & Omar, 2015). The board does not only 
monitor management activities but also provide the management with 
strategic guidelines to review and ratify management proposals (Jonsson, 
2005). Due to legally vested responsibility, the board should spot problems 
early and “blow the whistle” (Salmon, 1993). 
Board independence was recognised as an issue upon the market 
crash (2011) in Bangladesh. The challenge of forming an independent 
and effective board depends on ownership structure. This study strives to 
address this issue. The purpose of this study is to provide empirical evidence 
regarding the role of corporate ownership in forming an independent and 
effective board.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The previous works on corporate governance (CG) cover issues such as CG 
structures, CG codes and the relationship between CG and firm performance, 
CG and firm value, CG and corporate accruals, CG and financial disclosure, 
CG and market capitalisation CG and corporate revenue, the assessment 
of current practice in light of CG guidelines and so on. In the previous 
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regression models, board size, ownership structure, board independence, 
dominant personality, board composition, external auditor, director’s 
compensation are used as independent variables (CG variables) to examine 
the influence of these variables over dependent variables such as corporate 
accruals (Hasan, Abdul Rahman & Hossain, 2014; Houqe, Zijl, Dunstan & 
Karim, 2010), financial disclosure (Hasan, Hossain & Swieringa, 2013a), 
firm performance (Bonn, 2004a; Chin, Vos & Casey, 2004; Samad, Amir & 
Ibrahim, 2008), firm value (Klein, Shapiro & Young, 2005; Lefort & Urzúa, 
2008), market capitalisation (Hasan & Omar, 2015), corporate revenue 
(Hasan, Omar & Handley-Schachler, 2015a) and so on. 
A short review of previous works is presented to identify the research 
gap. Bonn (2004) examined the relationship between board structure and 
performance of large Australian firms. He found a positive association 
between the ratio of nonexecutive director and firm performance. Samad, 
Amir and Ibrahim (2008) found a significant relationship between firm 
performance and board size, independent directors and chairman-chief-
executive duality for family and nonfamily ownership while comparing 
CG and performance between listed companies in family and nonfamily 
ownership in Malaysia. However, Chin, Vos and Casey (2004) did not find 
a statistically significant relationship between firm performance and board 
composition or size or equity ownership structure. On the other hand, 
Klein, Shapiro and Young (2005) found an association between board 
structure and performance of family firms while looking at the relationship 
between firm value and CG practice of Canadian firms. Rashid, De Zoysa 
and Rodkin (2007) conducted a survey to examine corporate governance 
practice of Bangladeshi listed companies in light of two dominant models, 
which are the Anglo-American Model and German-Japanese Model, which 
requires an additional governance structure, which is a supervisory board 
with veto power over some decisions. They found the practice of Anglo-
American board in Bangladesh. Ahmed, Alam, Jafar and Zaman (2008) 
reviewed the CG framework, CG model, CG and firm performance as well 
as CG and firm valuation. The research also examined the relationship 
between CG and others factors like ownership structure, board members 
and firm performance from the previous studies. Lefort and Urzúa (2008) 
provided empirical evidence from Chile, where independent directors and 
professional directors are included in the board. They found a relationship 
between the proportion of independent directors and company value. Chen 
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and Hsu (2009) examined the relationship between family ownership, 
board independence and Research and Development (R&D) investment. 
They found a negative relationship between family ownership and R&D 
investment. They also claimed that family firms may increase R&D 
investment when board is more independent. 
Houqe, Zijl, Dunstan and Karim (2010) examined the relationship 
between corporate governance and discretionary accruals. They found a 
significant and positive relationship between good CG and firm quality 
earnings. However, Hasan, Hossain and Abdul Rahman (2014a) only 
found a significant relationship between public ownership and corporate 
accruals. They stated that corporate accruals are not from business cycle, 
as they do not contribute to company wealth, but they come from the 
brain of top management in tuning the accounting figures for the sake of 
appearance. Rashid, De Zoysa and Rudkin (2010) studied the influence of 
corporate board composition in the form of external independent director 
proportion on firm economic performance in Bangladesh. They found that 
the external (independent) directors do not add potential value to the firm 
economic performance. Karim, Sarkar and Fowzia (2010) examined the 
compliance of CG practice and CG guidelines. Huq and Bhuiyan (2012) 
explored problems and weaknesses related to CG practice in the Bangladeshi 
banking industry. Ferdous (2012) examined the compliance with CG code 
by developing a corporate governance index (CGI). Koerniadi and Tourani-
Rad (2012) studied the effect of independent directors on firm value in New 
Zealand, using market-based performance measure and accounting-based 
ratio, and found that independent directors have negative effect on firm 
value. Fauzi and Locke (2012) studied the role of board structure and the 
effect of ownership structure on firm performance in New Zealand’s listed 
firms. They found a significant relationship between board of directors, 
board committees, managerial ownership and firm performance. Hasan, 
Hossain and Swieringa (2013a) found a significant relationship between 
CG and financial disclosure. 
Hasan, Abdul Rahman and Hossain (2014) examined the relationship 
between family ownership and CG structure. They found a deviation in the 
CG practice of listed companies from the criteria set in the guidelines. They 
also claimed that good governance is not feasible under a family-based 
corporate culture. Rashid (2015) examined the relationship between board 
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independence and firm agency cost for listed firms in Bangladesh. The 
study did not find a significant relationship between board independence 
and other attributes such as board and agency cost. It was claimed that the 
external directors in the board are not truly independent. Bertoni, Meoli 
and Vismara (2014) analysed a sample of 969 firms that went public in 
France, Germany and Italy between 1995 and 2011. They found board 
independence is a critical factor in the valuation of initial public offering 
(IPO) firms. Hasan and Omar (2015) examined the impact of firm-level 
CG on market capitalisation, in which there is a significant relationship 
between board independence and market capitalisation. Hasan, Omar and 
Handley-Schachler (2015a) found a significant relationship between CG and 
corporate revenue, demonstrating the CG ability to generate revenue for firm. 
However, the studies did not examine the importance of board independence 
separately, leaving a research gap, in which this study attempts to fill the 
gap by developing an empirical model, where the dependent variable is 
board independence. The objective of this study is to assess the degree of 
corporate ownership influence on board independence. 
THE VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES
The variables are selected in line with the study objective. Board 
independence (BI = y) is selected as dependent variable while family 
ownership (FO = x1), public ownership (PO = x2) and institutional 
ownership (IO = x3) are selected as independent variables with the aim to 
estimate the effect of ownership structure on board independence. Board 
size (BS = x4), dominant personality (DP = x5), and external auditor (EA 
= x6) are selected as control variables. The definition and measurement of 
the variables and the value range are presented in Table 1. A brief review of 
literature in relation to the dependent and independent variables is presented 
in Table 1.
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Table 1: The Definition, Measurement and Range of Values of Variables
Variables Definition Measurement Range of Values
Dependent Variable
Board 
Independence 
(BI)
Board independence 
is defined as 
the proportion of 
independent directors in 
the board.
Number of independent 
non-executive directors 
divided by total number 
of directors on the 
board
0 - 1
Independent Variables
Family 
ownership 
(FO)
Sponsor shareholders 
i.e., Family ownership
Code “1” for majority 
of share held by family 
members and “0” 
otherwise.
0, 1
Public 
Ownership 
(PO)
Public ownership is 
defined as the ratio of 
shares held by general 
people in the ownership 
structure of sample 
companies.
Total number of shares 
held by general people 
divided by total number 
of issued shares
0 - 1
Institutional 
Ownership 
(IO)
Institutional ownership 
is defined as the ratio of 
institutional holdings in 
the ownership structure 
of sample companies.
Total number of shares 
held by institutions 
divided by total number 
of issued shares or “0” 
otherwise
0 - 1
Control Variables
Board Size 
(BS)
Board size is defined as 
total number of directors 
in the board of sample 
companies.
Number of the board of 
directors.
≤ 20
Dominant 
Personality 
(DP)
Dominant personality is 
defined as the position 
of Chairman and CEO 
of sample companies 
are the same person.
Code “1” if Chairman 
also holds the position 
of CEO and “0” 
otherwise
0, 1
External 
Auditor (EA)
External auditor 
is defined as the 
reputation of the auditor 
of sample companies. 
Code “1” for 
internationally linked 
audit firm and “0” 
otherwise
0, 1
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Board Independence
Board independence is the key factor in the CG system. A lack of 
board independence indicates low governance and becomes an obstacle to 
the fulfillment of board legal responsibilities. As a result, the interests of 
stakeholders including minority shareholders are not strongly protected. 
Therefore, the importance of external directors is recognised at the public 
policy level, where corporate governance codes have the need for a 
reasonable proportion of external directors on the board. Empirical evidence 
shows that a properly constituted boards with the right mix of nonexecutive 
directors tend to contribute to performance than board that is dominated by 
internal directors (Weisbach, 1988; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Bhagat & 
Black 2001; Mehran, 1995; John & Senbet, 1998; Fosberg, 1989; Yermack, 
1996). Board independence is measured by the proportion of external 
independent directors on the board. According to the provision of corporate 
governance guidelines, one independent director is required for every four 
executive directors. The ratio of external directors to internal directors is 
1:4, which is 20 percent. The following null hypothesis is formulated for 
this study, to examine the relationship between board independence and 
corporate ownership.
H1:	 There	is	no	significant	relationship	between	board	independence	
and	corporate	ownership.
This hypothesis is tested by three alternative hypotheses, to see the 
effect of three ownership types, namely family ownership, public ownership 
and institutional ownership, on board independence.
Family Ownership
Family ownership is a big issue in Bangladesh, a country where family 
members predominate and business environment is virtually unregulated 
with managerial incentive rather than regulatory influence, in which this 
situation tend to induce disclosure and influence other reporting issues 
(Hasan & Omar, 2016). The majority of public company ownership (almost 
85 percent) is in the custody of family members (Hasan, Abdul Rahman & 
Hossain, 2014). The Probe Committee (2011) found that they are responsible 
for the recent stock market crash. Information asymmetry is one of the 
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major issues in this situation. The board is supposed to appoint independent 
directors who work collaboratively with them. Therefore, they spread their 
control over the board by using their discretionary voting power. They 
ignore the interest of outsiders and take decision from a family perspective 
instead of business perspective, which is a major cause of concern. Family-
owned companies are less transparent and exercise less voluntary disclosure 
because of lower demand for information by nonfamily shareholders, as no 
consensus is required from nonfamily shareholders in business decision (Ali, 
Chen & Radhakrishnan, 2007). Although Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) 
highlight a combination of ownership and control to mitigate management 
expropriation, prior studies prove negative association between family firm 
and board independence. In Malaysia, Ibrahim and Abdul Samad (2011) 
found a negative 23.5 percent correlation between independent directors 
and family ownership, which is quite similar to a negative 36 percent 
correlation in a study conducted by Mishra, Randoy and Jenssen (2001) 
on Norwegian firms. Therefore, it is hypothesised that the higher family 
ownership proportion in the firm affects board independence, leading to the 
following alternative hypothesis.
H1a:	 There	is	a	significant	association	between	board	independence	
and	family	ownership.
Public Ownership 
Public ownership is the weakest form of ownership from the aspect 
of control and the public does not usually have access to the company day-
to-day account. They must depend on company annual report for necessary 
information to evaluate their investment decision. Corporate management is 
responsible to prepare annual report, whereas board of directors is responsible 
to approve it and the external auditor is responsible to give opinion regarding 
its truth and fairness. Management has a unique ability to perpetrate fraud 
by overstating or understating earnings. They can use discretion to misstate 
(overstate or understate) the financial information, manipulating the 
performance. The risk of information asymmetry and misstatement in annual 
report explains why regulators, policy makers, pressure groups, market 
operators, professional bodies and researchers are concerned to protect the 
right of minority shareholders (Hasan, Hossain & Abdul Rahman, 2014a). 
Accounting manipulation is one of the malpractices used to hike the share 
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price. Is was found that board of directors and some audit firms fail to perform 
their duties with sincerity and honesty (Probe Committee Report, 2011) 
. Without board independence, it is difficult to guard against malpractice 
such as taking advantage of information asymmetry. Under asymmetric 
information hypothesis and signalling theory, Xu and Xie (2014) attempted 
to identify factors affecting the price of entrepreneural firm initial public 
offering (IPO). Based on 153 listed firms in China’s Growth Enterprise 
Market (GEM), an empirical test for the correlation between IPO pricing and 
board of director independence was run. They find that the top management 
ownership is significantly correlated with IPO offering pricing. This means 
that the top management is acting as internal shareholders in the pricing of 
entrepreneurial firms than the financially independent boards of directors. 
Public ownership is when a proportion of company shares are owned 
by the public. The following alternative hypothesis in relation to board 
independence and public ownership is therefore tested. 
H1b:	 There	is	a	significant	association	between	board	independence	
and	public	ownership.
Institutional Ownership
Institutional and corporate structure differ between countries 
(Koerniadi & Tourani-Rad, 2012). The level of ownership influences the 
effectiveness of independent directors in monitoring firm performance 
(Lawrence & Stapledon, 1999). In 2003, Healy (2003) found that 
institutional ownership in New Zealand was 76 percent, which was much 
higher than in the US or UK, where institutional ownership was 39.8 
percent and 60.8 percent, respectively. The high level of ownership in New 
Zealand acts as a substitute to compensate weak investor legal protection 
and underdeveloped capital market (Mikkelson & Partch, 1997; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997). In Bangladesh, the institutional ownership does not play 
a role in making an independent and effective board (World Bank Report, 
2009). It is also argued that high ownership level results in “entrenchment 
effect” and has negative effect on company performance and valuation 
(Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1988). Institutional ownership is defined as the 
proportion of company shares owned by financial institution. The following 
alternative hypothesis is tested to assess the role of financial institution in 
establishing an independent and effective board.
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H1c:	 There	is	a	significant	association	between	board	independence	
and	institutional	ownership.
CONCEPTUAL MODEL
Figure 1 shows a diagrammatic visualisation of the model. Board 
independence is an aspect in corporate governance. Hypothesis H1 is related 
to the effect of corporate ownership on board independence. Next, corporate 
ownership is segregated into three categories, which are family ownership, 
public ownership and institutional ownership. Then, the influence of each 
ownership category on board independence is statistically estimated by using 
multiple regression. Hypotheses 1a (H1a), 1b (H1b) and 1c (H1c) are related 
to the influence of family ownership, public ownership and institutional 
ownership on the establishment of a professionally independent board. 
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Figure 1: Research Model of Corporate Ownership and Board Independence 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
Data
Corporate annual reports in 2010 and 2011 were available for 68 out of 155 nonfinancial 
companies listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange, the largest stock market in Bangladesh by 
number of listings. The 68 companies are used as sample for the present research. The CG 
practice of these companies were compared with CG guidelines. The data for dependent, 
independent and control variables are extracted from the companies’ corporate annual report. 
Methods
Descriptive statistics, bivariate analysis, and multiple regression techniques were applied in the 
analysis. The descriptive statistics are used to show the current situation, the bivariate 
(correlation matrix) analysis is used to detect the multicollinearity problem between independent 
variables and multiple regression is conducted to test the three alternative hypotheses. 
Figure 1: Research Model of Corporate 
Ownership and Board Independence
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RESEARCH APPROACH
Data
Corporate annual reports in 2010 and 2011 were available for 68 out of 
155 nonfinancial companies listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange, the largest 
stock market in Bangladesh by number of listings. The 68 companies are 
used as sample for the present research. The CG practice of these companies 
were compared with CG guidelines. The data for dependent, independent and 
control variables are extracted from the companies’ corporate annual report.
Methods
Descriptive statistics, bivariate analysis, and multiple regression 
techniques were applied in the analysis. The descriptive statistics are used 
to show the current situation, the bivariate (correlation matrix) analysis is 
used to detect the multicollinearity problem between independent variables 
and multiple regression is conducted to test the three alternative hypotheses.
Because of the prevalence of family ownership in Bangladeshi 
corporations, the variable for family ownership is a binary variable, in which 
1 is the case when majority of ownership belongs by a family and 0 is for 
the opposite. This is to test whether absolute family control affects board 
independence. The other ownership variables (public and institutional) have 
a continuous range, represented by percentage. State ownership of shares is 
not included in this study, although further research can scrutinise this factor.
A regression model is developed for this study to estimate the degree 
of influence and to assess the effect of and each type of share ownership 
(family, public and institutional) on board independence and other possible 
attitudes. The regression model matrix is presented below. The numbers of 
rows and columns in the matrix represent the board independence variable of 
r for company i (the dependent variable is yi) are 68 and 1 respectively. The 
numbers of rows and columns for the matrix representing the independent 
variables for company i are 68 and 7 respectively. The numbers of rows 
and columns for the intercept and coefficients to be established by the 
regression analysis are 7 (6 coefficients plus the intercept) and 1 respectively. 
Meanwhile, the numbers of rows and columns for the error term are 68 and 
1 respectively.
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Where
Dependent Variable: Independent Variables:
yi = Board independence of company i Ownership Variables 
n = Number of company observation = 68 x1 = Family ownership 
The Error Term: x2 = Public ownership 
εi  x3 = Institutional ownership 
Regression Parameters: Control Variables: 
β0 = Intercept of the model (constant) x4 = Board size 
βj = Coefficient of independent variable j x5 = Dominant personality 
p = Number of independent variables = 6 x6 = External auditor 
Where
Dependent Variable: Independent Variables:
yi = Board independence of company i Ownership Variables
n = Number of company observation = 68 x1 = Family ownership
The Error Term: x2 = Public ownership
εi x3 = Institutional 
ow ership
Regression Parameters: Control Variables:
β0 = Intercept of the model (constant) x4 = Board size
βj = Coefficient of independent variable j x5 = Dominant 
pers nality
p = Number of independent variables = 6 x6 = External auditor
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Looking at the results of descriptive statistics, Table 2 shows that the 
average board independence is at 15 percent, however the value should 
be at least 20 percent, as stipulated by the provision of CG guidelines4. 
According to this provision, an independent director is required for every 
four executive board members for board independence. It is also observed 
that some companies do not even have one independent director despite 
4  Section 1.2 sub section i of corporate governance guidelines 2006.
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the requirement for a minimum of one independent director and some 
companies have only one independent director even there are ten board 
members. Many companies do not maintain the required ratio of independent 
directors and board size. In Malaysia, if a company has only three board 
members, two of them are required to be independent5. The table also shows 
that the ownership of 85 percent companies belongs to family members. 
The users of financial report believe that good governance is not possible 
under family-based culture (Hasan, Abdullah & Hossain, 2014c). The 
average proportion of company ownership is 41 percent. It indicates a good 
individual participation in the capital market but they are not happy with the 
corporate behaviour. Looking at institutional ownership, the average rate of 
company institutional ownership is 20 percent. Institutional stakeholders 
are more knowledgeable and powerful than other stakeholders. They play 
an important role to implement good governance but in Bangladesh, the 
role is limited6. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation CV
BI 68 0 1 0.15 0.14 0.96
FO 68 0 1 0.85 0.36 0.42
PO 68 0.05 0.94 0.41 0.22 0.53
IO 68 0 0.86 0.2 0.21 1.07
BS 68 3 17 7.4 2.29 0.31
DP 68 0 1 0.26 0.44 1.71
EA 68 0 1 0.22 0.42 1.9
From Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient (Table 3), 
the results show that there is no multicollinearity problem between the 
independent variables. This result confirms the nonexistence of linear 
combination of the variables. Detection of multicollinearity between 
independent variables is a precondition for multiple regression analysis. If 
multicollinearity exists between two variables, then one variable needs to be 
dropped from the model as the two variables measure the same thing. The 
linear correlation is not considered, indicating multicollinearity exceeds 0.80 
5  Listing requirements of Bushra Malaysia Securities Berhad (2006), Busra, Malaysia
6  World Bank. 2009. Report on the observance of standards and codes. Dhaka: World Bank.
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or 0.90 (Judge, Griffiths, Hill, Lutkepohl & Lee, 1985; Bryman & Cramer, 
1997). Thus, the proposed multiple regression model is conducted without 
removing any variable from the model. 
Table 3: Correlations Matrix
Variables FO PO IO BS DP EA
FO 1
PO 0.403** 1
IO -0.358** -0.410** 1
BS -0.403** -0.104 0.092 1
DP 0.249* 0.083 -0.17 -0.061 1
EA -0.380** -0.306* 0.389** 0.219 -0.158 1
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
The results of multiple regression analysis are shown in Table 4. Family 
ownership has negative influence on board independence at one percent 
significance level. However, these results reveal no significant influence of 
other ownership types (institutional ownership and public ownership) on 
board independence. Therefore, research hypothesis 1a is accepted while 
hypothesis1b and hypothesis 1c are rejected. The beta value of institutional 
ownership (IO) and public ownership (PO) are positive (0.019, 0.031 
respectively) but not significant, while for family ownership (FO), the 
beta value is negative and significant (-0.380 at 0.01 level). Consequently, 
family ownership is considered as an obstruction to board independence. 
The results also reveal that there is no significant relationship between any 
control variables and board independence. 
Table 4: Results of Regression Test of the Model
Predictors Coefficients T - Value P – Value
FO -0.38 -3.339 0.001***
PO 0.031 0.248 0.805
IO 0.019 0.154 0.878
BS -0.147 -1.189 0.239
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DP -0.041 -0.346 0.73
EA -0.017 -0.137 0.892
Note: *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
The current level of board independence was reviewed by using 8 
questions (Table 5) to view a present situation of board independence in 
companies in general. The results indicate there are insufficient independent 
directors on board for operational management (Questions 1-3) and some 
companies have no independent director at all. In addition, some external 
directors are former executives of the company (Question 4), which 
may compromise their task in scrutinising the effect of past decision or 
longstanding policy independently and effectively. Some independent 
directors also have lack of required expertise to challenge the action of 
executive directors (Question 5). In some firms, the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) is also the Chairman of the Board (Question 6), which is contrary 
to recommendation in the CG Guidelines. 
The separation of the two roles has two desirable effects: first, it 
ensures that there are at least two directors, preventing a director from 
running the company without being scrutinised; second, when the Chairman 
and CEO are two different persons, the Chairman usually has nonexecutive 
role, ensuring that there is a powerful nonexecutive figure whom the CEO 
is answerable to. When a dominant figure occupies both positions, it is 
easier for that person to take decision which are not in the best interest of 
the company. For example, the person may act out of self-interest or in the 
interest of another firm in which the CEO is involved as a shareholder or 
employee or at the behest of political interest, and sometimes inadvertently, 
the person acts recklessly, without sufficient knowledge. In other cases, 
there is a personal, particularly marital relationship between the Chairman 
and CEO, which leads to weak scrutiny as long as the relationship remain 
intact. There is a risk of information leak in regards to company affairs 
in the event of family dispute. As shown in Table 3, family ownership 
is the most common form of ownership but this is often combined with 
the existence of nonfamily shareholders minority, whose interest is under 
threat of misappropriation of income and assets by family members or 
companies owned by them. The nonfamily shareholders are also vulnerable 
to information asymmetry in the dealing of shares and voting at shareholders’ 
meetings.
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Besides, higher information asymmetry level (Hasan, Abdul Rahman 
& Hossain, 2014b; Hasan, Abdullah & Hossain, 2014c), lower disclosure 
level (Hasan & Hossain, 2012; Hasan & Hossain, 2012a; Hasan, 2013; 
Hasan, Hossain & Swieringa, 2013a; Hasan & Hossain, 2013b), and negative 
impression by users towards corporate financial reporting (Hasan, 2013; 
Hasan, Abdullah & Hossain, 2014c) result in board inactivity. Moreover, 
the overall quality of corporate financial reporting is either poor or not 
credible at all (Hasan & Omar, 2016). The present governance practice of 
listed companies is also poor (Hasan, Abdul Rahman & Hossain, 2014). 
Table 5: Eight Questions on Board 
Independence and Corporate Governance
Question 
No. Question Results
Recommended 
by CG 
Guidelines
Comment
1 For those companies with 
independent directors, 
what is the lowest 
number of independent 
directors on the board? 
1 2 Minimum number of 
directors should be two 
as per Bursa Malaysia, 
2006 (Hasan, Abdul 
Rahman and Hossain, 
2014). 
2 Is the proportion of 
independent directors 
on the board below the 
recommended proportion 
in the CG Guidelines, 
which recommends that 
companies maintain a 
ratio of inside directors 
to outside directors of no 
more than 4: 1?
Yes No During the survey 
of annual reports, it 
was observed that 
some firms have more 
than five directors 
but they have only 
one independent 
director. The average 
proportion of 
independent directors 
on the board is 15 
percent, which is lower 
than 20 percent as per 
CG Guidelines.
3 Do all sample companies 
appoint Independent 
Directors?
No Yes During survey of 
annual reports, it is 
observed that some 
companies have not 
yet appointed an 
independent director to 
the board.
4 Is there any relationship 
between inside directors 
and independent 
directors?
Yes No Most of the outside 
directors are former 
executives (Rashid, 
2011). 
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Question 
No. Question Results
Recommended 
by CG 
Guidelines
Comment
5 Do independent directors 
have sufficient knowledge 
and experience which 
could be used as a guard 
of protecting managers 
from information 
asymmetry?
No Yes In some cases it 
is observed that 
they do not have 
sufficient expertise 
to prevent managers 
from opportunistic 
behaviour. Rashid, 
De Zoysa and Rudkin 
(2010) find that outside 
director cannot add 
potential value to 
the firm’s economic 
performance in 
Bangladesh. 
6 Is the Chairman ever the 
same person as the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO)?
Yes No Some firms still have 
the same person with 
a dual position as 
chairman and CEO) in 
the name of minimizing 
the operating 
expenses although 
CG Guideline does not 
allow this duality.
7 Is there ever any 
personal relationship 
between Chairman and 
CEO?
Yes No In some cases, it is 
observed that wife 
holds Chairman’s 
position and husband 
hold CEO’s position. 
Again, father holds 
chairman’s position 
and elder son holds 
managing director’s 
position.
8 Is family ownership 
greater than other 
category?
Yes Not a Matter for 
CG Guidelines
It is found that 85 
percent of ownership 
of sampled companies 
are in the hand of 
family members or 
sponsor directors.
The results reveal that of the three categories of corporate ownership, 
only family ownership has a significant influence on board independence. 
In other words, the agency problem between shareholders and family 
ownership is very acute in Bangladesh. The negative attitude (negative 
beta value) of family ownership towards board independence is a great 
barrier for firm to practise fairness, accountability, responsibility and 
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transparency as family members want to gain control of everything. As 
board is not independent, then it is not feasible for them (board of directors) 
to discharge their fiduciary duties on behalf of shareholders properly. 
Besides, it is difficult to achieve separation of ownership and control. On 
the other hand, the positive attitude (positive beta value) of institutional 
ownership and public ownership towards board independence indicates 
that the companies want an independent and effective board for fairness, 
accountability, responsibility and transparency in governance. If board is 
not independent, then it is possible for unethical managers to take advantage 
of information asymmetry and use their position to further their own 
agenda rather than those of owners, engaging in managerial opportunism 
(Williamson, 1996). They are in a position to hide or distort information, 
by keeping these actions hidden or appear as they are for the best interest 
of shareholders. Shareholders do not realise that there are individuals who 
have the tendency in advance (Downes & Russ, 2005). The temptation to 
drive up share price artificially, fabricate profit, and hide loss is too great for 
those whose job depend on the results (Zandstra, 2002). There is an irony 
when directors themselves display opportunism, as this defeats their purpose. 
Therefore, the board, as part of their fiduciary duties to the shareholders, 
must vigorously seek truth in any situation by being active and proactive, 
rather than passive and reactive (Downes & Russ, 2005).
Family owners have incentive to expropriate minority shareholders 
or entrench themselves in managerial position (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
In general, they prefer to establish board that do not try to alleviate their 
discretion over decision making (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Chen & Jaggi, 
2000). Board members are dominated by family members or close friends 
and there are only a few of independent directors (Meng, 2009). The majority 
of the board members are children and relatives, who act as the executive 
or nonexecutive directors (Arman, 2010). This reduces the board ability 
curtail the activities of managers, who are family members or have close 
relationship with the owners. They may try to manage earnings to meet the 
interest of family owners at the expense of minority shareholders. From a 
perception study, good governance is not feasible in a family dominating 
culture (Hasan, 2013). Hence, board should comprise a majority of 
“independent” directors who are free from commercial or personal ties, 
that could impair their ability to probe and challenge management (Felton 
& Watson, 2002). An independent and effective board can ensure corporate 
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management accountability, which leads to good governance practice in 
the firm.
CONCLUSION
The study concludes that board is not independent and among three corporate 
ownership, only family ownership has a negatively significant influence on 
board independence. Although institutional ownership and public ownership 
have no significant influence, but they show a positive correlation with board 
independence. The study suggests the need to rethink the way to establish 
an independent and professional board, without majority of shareholders 
especially family members being a barrier. Otherwise, it is not possible to 
reduce information asymmetry. The selection of an external, professional 
director on the board should be conducted through a search committee 
to ensure their competency and the minimum number of independent 
directors should be at least two. In light of positive reinforcement theory of 
motivation, the management should be motivated with this idea in solving 
the issues. Two-tier board, which exists in Germany, Netherlands and Japan 
should be considered, as this requires the existence of an oversight board, 
which consists of no company directors. However, the establishment of 
an oversight board which is elected by shareholders and middle managers 
create another avenue company owners (family members) to thwart decision 
taken by the directors.
An alternative is to use legislation that requires the presence of audit 
committee and other board committee without the CEO, in which the audit 
committee wholly consists of nonexecutives to receive report from internal 
auditors without interference from executives (Committee on the Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992). The creation of board committee, 
however, does not guarantee the involvement of independent nonexecutives 
in strategic decision, where their influence is useful counter to the interest 
of family members on the board. In addition, independent directors can be 
selected from available individuals who share similar view or are easily 
influenced by executives.
It is necessary to establish a board which is not only effective but also 
independent to discuss company affairs transparently and objectively at the 
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board meeting. This board can be either a “bloodhound” for opportunities 
and threats and the “watchdog” for malpractice within the corporation, 
thus contributing to good strategy and good governance. The study used 
secondary data and could not consider other board independence aspects 
such as educational qualification, age and professional experience. A study 
to cover all aspects of board independence as well as corporate governance 
is useful to detect the specific weaknesses where corrective measures can 
be taken to improve the situation.
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